Food Regime Analysis and ‘Post-Neoliberal’ Dynamic

The State-Capital Nexus, China, and the Rise/Demise of ‘Pink Tide’ States in Latin America

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Abstract
2019 marks the 30th anniversary of Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael’s seminal 1989 paper in *Sociologia Ruralis, Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present*. Anticipating this event affords an opportunity to re-appraise the premises, theory, and temporal conjuncture that informed their paper. The rise of the BRICS countries, and particularly China, also stimulates a re-appraisal of the premises and theoretical categories informing Food Regime Analysis as deployed by these authors. Thus, the rise of greater ‘positive coordination’ (Tilzey and Potter 2007) of food production and distribution by the state in the form, variously, of neo-mercantilism/neo-productivism and neo-developmentalism, as exemplified by China and the ‘pink tide’ states, serves not only to highlight a changed historical conjuncture in the wake of the 2007/8 food and financial crises (which we may denote as ‘post-neoliberal’), but, in so doing, also challenges more profoundly some of the theoretical foundations of Friedmann and McMichael’s – and particularly McMichael’s – characterization of food regimes. The paper argues that a fundamental re-appraisal of the basic theoretical categories deployed by Friedmann and McMichael in their development of Food Regime Analysis is long overdue, and that these basic categories comprise: capitalism, the state, and class, together with the nature of agency in relation to these categories. We propose concepts such as the ‘state-capital nexus’ and ‘structured agency’ (Tilzey 2016, 2017, 2018) as a means to resolve what are seen as significant difficulties and lacunae in Friedmann and McMichael’s original, and indeed ongoing, thinking in Food Regime Analysis. The deployment of these ‘new’ concepts enables us to conceive of much closer relations between capitalism, the modern state, class contestation, and imperialism in the dynamics of food regimes, concepts which imply that we should not be at all surprised by the re-emergence of phenomena such a neo-mercantilism and neo-developmentalism. The paper goes on to delineate key relations between the emergence of China as a sub-imperium and the dynamics of the ‘pink tide’ states in Latin America. The paper concludes by drawing out some of the implications of this ‘new’ theorisation of food regimes (and state, capital, class relations more generally) for anti- and post-capitalist emancipatory politics, particularly in relation to food sovereignty and a ‘dual strategy’ of counter-hegemony.

Keywords
Food Regime; State-capital nexus; China; ‘Pink Tide’ States; Food Sovereignty
1. Introduction

2019 marks the 30th anniversary of Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael’s seminal 1989 paper in *Sociologia Ruralis, Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present*. Anticipating this event affords an opportunity to re-appraise the premises, theory, and temporal conjuncture that informed their paper. The rise of the BRICS countries, and particularly China, also stimulates a re-appraisal of the premises and theoretical categories informing Food Regime Analysis as deployed by these authors. Thus, the rise of greater ‘positive coordination’ (Tilzey and Potter 2007) of food production and distribution by the state in the form, variously, of neo-mercantilism/neo-productivism and neo-developmentalism, as exemplified by China and the ‘pink tide’ states, serves not only to highlight a changed historical conjuncture in the wake of the 2007/8 food and financial crises (which we may denote as ‘post-neoliberal’), but, in so doing, also challenges more profoundly some of the theoretical foundations of Friedmann and McMichael’s - and particularly McMichael’s - characterization of food regimes.

The paper begins by arguing that a fundamental re-appraisal of the basic theoretical categories deployed by Friedmann and McMichael in their development of Food Regime Analysis is long overdue, and that these basic categories comprise: capitalism, the state, and class, together with the nature of agency in relation to these categories. We propose concepts such as the ‘state-capital nexus’ and ‘structured agency’ (Tilzey 2016, 2017, 2018) as a means to resolve what are seen as significant difficulties and lacunae in Friedmann and McMichael’s original, and indeed ongoing, thinking in Food Regime Analysis.

These ‘new’ concepts enable us to conceive of much closer relations between capitalism, the modern state, class contestation, and imperialism in the dynamics of food regimes, concepts which imply that we should not be at all surprised by the re-emergence of phenomena such a neo-mercantilism and neo-developmentalism. In this way, the paper goes on, in the next section, to deploy these concepts as the basis for a revised causal framework for, and periodization of, food regimes.

In the following section, the paper delineates key relations between the emergence of China as a sub-imperium and the dynamics of the ‘pink tide’ states in Latin America, identifying the interplay between the ‘internal’ dynamics of the state-capital nexus and the ‘external’ enabling or constraining environment defined by imperial and sub-imperial strategies of accumulation. The paper concludes by drawing out some of the implications of this ‘new’ theorisation of food regimes (and state, capital, class relations more generally) for anti- and post-capitalist emancipatory politics, particularly in relation to a ‘dual strategy’ in pursuit of ‘radical’ food sovereignty.
2. Premises and Problems in Friedmann and McMichael’s 1989, and Subsequent, Theorization of Food Regimes.

In their 1989 paper in *Sociologia Ruralis*, Friedmann and McMichael sought to explore, as a key objective, ‘the role of agriculture in the development of the capitalist world economy, and in the trajectory of the state system’ (1989, 93). A re-assessment of their paper would reasonably be expected to ask, therefore, how these authors understand and define capitalism and the state, the relation between capitalism and the state, and the relation between states. We undertake this task below. Also fundamental to food regime dynamics, and to those of capitalism and the state, we argue, are class relations. These relations do not, however, receive prominence of Friedmann and McMichael’s paper, and the reasons for, and implications of, this lacuna are also explored.

First, we address Friedmann and McMichael’s treatment of capitalism. Interestingly, they provide no explicit definition of this concept, but do refer to Aglietta (1979), a key figure in Regulation Theory (RT). Here, however, they reference only his discussion of capital accumulation (theorized as a ‘Regime of Accumulation’ from which we assume the term ‘food regime’ derives) and fail to address the ‘Mode of Regulation’, a category of equal significance. Shorn of the ‘Mode of Regulation’, it is difficult to comprehend capitalism as a class-defined and contradiction-ridden mode of exploitation that exists in an ‘internal’ relation to the modern state, the latter performing vital support and legitimacy functions for capital without which it would be in jeopardy (van Apeldoorn et al. 2012). Such neglect of class and legitimation seems emblematic of Friedmann and McMichael’s intellectual debt to World System Theory (WST), food regime theory’s (FRT) other principal theoretical progenitor (McMichael 2013). For WST (Wallerstein 1974, 1976), capitalism is understood as ‘production for profit’ in the sphere of circulation, a ‘neo-Smithian’, rather than Marxian, definition (Brenner 1977). For Marx, by contrast, capitalism comprised a specific class relation between capital and wage labour, in which surplus value through the exploitation of labour power is generated in the sphere of production.

By implication, then, Friedmann and McMichael fail to understand the ‘innermost secret’ of capitalism as the capital-labour relation, premised on the historical and
continued separation of surplus value generators from their means of production. Thus, despite invoking Marx’s ‘value theory’, Friedmann and McMichael seem to understand capitalism merely as production for profit through commodity exchange in the market, a necessary but insufficient definition. Arising from this WST conception of capitalism is a purely ‘quantitative’ definition which perceives an essential continuity in the nature of capitalism from the feudal epoch, through the absolutist state, to the modern era. In other words, what differentiates the latter from the pre-modern eras is simply the ‘amount’ of capitalism, rather than a qualitative change in its nature. We specify the deficiencies of this ‘quantitative’, and the advantages of a ‘qualitative’, definition of capitalism later on.

Second, and conjoined to the above, their conceptualization of the relation between capitalism and the modern state is seriously under-theorized. This concerns their neglect of the twin aspects of this relation that enable us to make sense of both entities in their dialectical co-constitution: the ‘separation in unity’ of the institutional spheres of the ‘economy’ and ‘polity’, and the complementary accumulation and legitimation functions of the state in relation to capital as defined by RT (Boyer and Saillard 2002). Friedmann and McMichael, however, deploy a dichotomous, rather than dialectical, understanding of the state-capital relation, with both entities reified and de-historicized. Their modern state seems to be nothing more than the contingent outcome of a sectoral articulation between agriculture and industry. An understanding of the state-capital relation needs to go far deeper than this, however.

Following Poulantzas (1975), it is more helpful to see the state, given the lack of ‘extra-economic’ influence that individual capitals can exert, as providing the essential institutional space for various fractions of the capitalist class, in addition possibly to other classes, to come together to form longer-term strategies and alliances whilst, simultaneously, the state disorganizes non-capitalist classes through various means of co-optation and division. The state, also for reasons of legitimation, must, additionally, be ‘relatively autonomous’ from the interests and demands of particular fractions of capital, and even from capital ‘in general’. So, as Poulantzas (1975) suggests, the state represents the condensation of the balance of class forces in society. For Friedmann and McMichael, by contrast, capital is a unitary entity, bereft of specific class and class fractional content, and is counter-posed to a ‘state’, a content-less abstraction which apparently represents, without mediation, the position of a generalized counter-movement. This aligns with a Polanyian, indeed neoclassical, conception of the state and
capital as essentialized and opposed entities. McMichael’s later conceptualization of the ‘corporate’ food regime seems to be a direct outgrowth of this view, neglecting the enduring importance of divergent fractions of capital in current dynamics and the pervasive significance of the territorial form, and potentially imperialist character, of the state. We suggest, by contrast, that the modern state is better conceptualized itself as a social relation, an arena or container (the state-capital nexus) (Taylor 1994; van Apeldoorn et al. 2012), within which class contestation and compromise is played out, principally to secure the material and ideological reproduction of the hegemonic fractions of capital, even where these may be transnational in orientation. Rather than existing beyond or outside the state, capital may be said to be instantiated by classes and class fractions within the very constitution of the state.

Third, Friedmann and McMichael either neglect, or deploy a deficient, class analysis, especially concerning inter-class ‘struggle’. From this derives serious shortcomings in their presentation of state/capital dynamics involving class contestation and compromise. In this, their stance has affinities with Polanyi’s avoidance of class and class contestation as causal factors in political economic dynamics (Tilzey 2017). By contrast, we suggest here, in line with the schools of Political Marxism (Brenner 1985; Mooers 1991; Wood 2002) and Neo-Gramscian IPE (Bieler and Morton 2004), that the prime mover in the formation and reproduction of food regimes is the social-property relations in the hegemonic state (in the world system) and the international articulation of these relations with receptive and complementary class interests in other states. This points to the pivotal importance of class, class struggle, and ‘hegemony’ in the birth and subsequent nurturing within the state-capital nexus, and then projection beyond the hegemon, of a specific regime of accumulation and, within it, a food regime. This explanatory frame resonates with Winders’ (2009a, b) suggestion that we should acknowledge the causal importance of agrarian (class) divisions and coalitions, together with their respective political power, in the germination of food regimes. Furthermore, and aligning with the position here, Winders suggests that the differential political power and economic interests of segments (i.e. class fractions) of agrarian capital mould each hegemon’s national policy, with that national policy then shaping agricultural production, distribution, and consumption throughout the global capitalist system. In implicit criticism of Friedmann and McMichael, he also indicates that ‘most analyses of food regimes...understate the fundamental role played by [political] coalitions and conflicts within agriculture’ (Winders 2009b, 316).
'National policy', stated otherwise, is the outcome of coalitions within the state-capital nexus, arising in turn from class contestation and compromise between hegemonic, sub-hegemonic, and oppositional interest groups. Should this ‘national policy’ successfully augment, through expanded capital accumulation, the power of the state, this state may then, through international projection of its regime of accumulation, aspire to the status of hegemon in the inter-state system. This process is exemplified by the emergence of the British ‘free trade’ food regime (1840s-1870s) as the first international capitalist regime of this kind, denoted by Tilzey (2018), consequently, as the ‘first’ or ‘Liberal Food Regime’. Winders (2009b) indicates that international institutions and trade agreements are the pillars on which food regimes spread, and concordant policies become widely adopted, through the international system. Far from entailing a process of ‘automatic’ diffusion, then, it is cross-national class coalitions and international alliances which act as conduits for the dissemination of a food regime. Such a class agential process obtains even in relations between a hegemon and a subordinate state, as between ‘core’ imperial states and those of the ‘periphery’, for example, in which case peripheral extroverted class fractions and imperial transnational class interests may fabricate symbioses. Thus, food regimes comprise specific forms of capital accumulation, and these forms comprise the favoured interests of a class fraction or coalition of class fractions within the hegemonic state, interests which may then be projected politically, via conscious class agency, into the international arena. Given that the intention is to augment the power of the state-capital nexus, this may generate relations of ‘combined and uneven development’ with other states (see below).

Fourthly, Friedmann and McMichael fail to articulate a theory of agency that might conjoin the categories of capital, state, and class by means of political action. Thus, while failing to identify the internal relations between capital and state, and the crucial understanding of both as class relations, they also fail, consequently, to grasp the role of class as a ‘bridging’ concept, one that encapsulates both structure and agency, or class position and positionality (Potter and Tilzey 2005). This concept makes it possible to identify the class fractional interests that comprise capitalist social relations and directs attention to strategies and understandings deployed by political agents in the defence or promotion of their interests. Elsewhere, this has been termed the ‘strategic relational approach’ (Jessop 2005), relating structure that defines positions to social practices/discourses (positionalities) of agents.
Since their 1989 paper, and in response to accusations of structuralist determinism, both authors have sought to qualify their positions. Thus, Friedmann (2005) has refocused on ‘social contention and elaboration of implicit rules [that] soften the initial conception of food regimes’ (McMichael 2013, 12). While Friedmann’s argument advances a little towards the Neo-Gramscian and Political Marxian approach advocated here, we suggest that it is not articulated systematically. McMichael, for his part, insists that his conceptualization of the ‘corporate’ food regime is ‘agentic’ (McMichael 2016, 657), a contention that seems to be belied by his signal lack of attention to the state as a social relation, to its distinct geopolitical concern to uphold accumulation and legitimation, and to classes, class fractions, and contestation. Substantively, McMichael’s deployment of agency and political contestation is confined to his binary, and Polanyian, treatment of capitalism as monolith versus generalized opposition as ‘double movement’. Of the two authors, it is McMichael who seems to have shifted position least, with his current stance representing a more or less direct outgrowth of the social ontology delineated in the 1989 paper.

Subsequent to the 1989 paper, McMichael (1991) has developed, however, the extremely useful method of ‘incorporated comparison’, which recognizes differentiated development in constituent parts of the capitalist world system, whilst at the same time seeing such differentiation as mutually dependent and conditioning. This method appears very similar to the ‘combined and uneven development’ approach advocated later in this paper. However, it is a method that appears, again, not to be translated into McMichael’s substantive analysis of food regimes, particularly when it comes to the ‘corporate’ food regime, in which states are seen as uniformly subordinate to, and in the service of, transnational capital (McMichael 2016, 649), rendering differentiated development an essentially redundant concept.

Lastly, Friedmann and McMichael take the principal contradiction of accumulation to be one of scale, embodied in trans-nationalization, the putatively inevitable destiny of capital. Since they lack a social and internal relational analysis of capitalism and the state, the solution to trans-nationalization is not its class relational subversion but, rather, (re-)localization, the ‘protective movement of our times’ (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 114). The implication is a binary and Polanyian conceptualization of an undifferentiated capitalism counter-posed to an undifferentiated localism as ‘double-movement’. This throws little light on the class complexion of this localism, however, nor on the relation of such localism to the state, which, far from melting away with the advent of neoliberalism, remains an
enduring and vital ‘container’ for capital (Taylor 1994). This focus on scale, or ‘sovereignty’ through proximity, rather than social relations anticipates the thinking of ‘progressives’ (amongst whom Friedmann and McMichael may themselves be numbered) rather than ‘radicals’ in the FS movement (see Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck 2011; Tilzey 2017).

These key premises, and we argue, problems in Friedmann and McMichael’s 1989 paper anticipate and, indeed, seem axiomatic in the discourse of later ‘populist’ and more transnational elements of the FS movement - key concepts for this discourse are: a relatively undifferentiated ‘corporate’ sector dominated by transnational capital; an undifferentiated ‘civil society’ that has the potential to act as a Polanyian ‘double movement’; a view of the state as being, by turns, an impartial and balanced arbiter of competing interests in society, a defender of the ‘public interest’ and national sovereignty, or an entity that is simply acting on behalf of ‘corporate’ interests. For the preceding reasons, we judge all three concepts to be radically under-theorized in Friedmann and McMichael’s paper.

Here, we assess the degree to which these key concepts and the problems (and absences) still characterize the discourses of Friedmann and McMichael. We use the recent debate between the two thinkers and Henry Bernstein (2016) as the basis for this assessment.

We begin with Friedmann who, of the two authors, has perhaps shifted her position most in relation to the 1989 paper, a shift that has opened up significant differences between herself and McMichael since 2005, particularly (Friedmann 2016). In her 2016 commentary, Friedmann thus rightly affirms McMichael’s method of ‘incorporated comparison’ as a significant theoretical contribution, but suggests, also rightly in our view, that he fails to apply this method substantively in his deployment of the ‘corporate’ food regime, reproducing in her view (and ours) a rigid binary comprising transnational capital, on the one hand, versus a generalized ‘opposition’, on the other. Relatedly, she criticizes both McMichael and Bernstein for an overly rigid understanding of capital’s ‘logic’, suggesting that capital is much more flexible than either allows, and that, contra Bernstein, there are other potential paths out of the present - nothing is pre-ordained. She thus emphasizes agency and resistance, pointing, for example, to Eric Wolf’s (1969) analysis of ‘peasant wars’. In this, Friedmann has moved significantly away from the apparent ‘structuralism’ of the 1989 paper. Nonetheless, we suggest that her theoretical categories for analysing such indeterminacy and agency are somewhat unstructured and unsystematised, comprising multiple agents in an undifferentiated totality, rather in the manner of actor-network theory (of which she
has spoken in approving terms - see Friedmann 2009). This unstructured approach to determinations and agency, compounded by a laxity in the definition of capitalism, leads her to speak of ‘cosmopolitan trans-locally networked futures everywhere, both North and South’ (Friedmann 2016, 681), a statement that suggests no systematic understanding of capitalism, the modern state, uneven development and imperialism, and differentiated resistances between imperium and periphery. This seems to confirm a continuing focus on localism as the key resolution to capitalism, and the key prerequisite for ‘counter-hegemonic’ sovereignty.

This sits oddly with her proposal, correct in our view, that a transition to post-capitalism would be something much deeper than a change in food regime, something more akin to the transition from feudalism to capitalism - in other words, a transformation in the social relations of production (that is, social-property relations). Unfortunately, she reproduces the error of WST and Arrighi, in dating this transition, as a generalized phenomenon, to five hundred years ago, thereby losing the class specificity of capitalism as understood by Marx. Such lack of understanding of the differencia specifica of capitalism then problematizes her understanding of what is, and what would be required to achieve, post-capitalism. Indeed, this seems to be manifest in her advocacy of trans-local networks - localism writ large - arising in the interstices of capital. While an important element of eco-socialism, localism per se hardly entails the kind of social relational transformation required for post-capitalism.

Despite his assertions of multiple determinations of the food regime, the key analytical categories for McMichael, as evidenced in his 2016 conversation with Bernstein, are and remain a generalized and undifferentiated (trans-nationalized) capitalism versus a generalized and undifferentiated counter-movement, comprising ‘small farmers’ worldwide. In other words, there is no real conceptualization of class, class fraction, or differentiated interest other than in terms of this binary. McMichael appears completely innocent of the possibility and reality of ‘peasant’ differentiation and intra-class contestation (manifest, for example, in ‘accumulation from below’), and in the possibility and reality of intra-class capitalist contestation (competitive ‘accumulation from above’). Similarly, the ‘state’ remains an abstract and pre-theoretical category, its relation to capital (as comprising class fractional interests) and to non-capitalist classes essentially unknown. The ‘state’ is, by turns, opposed to capital in asserting ‘national sovereignty’ or in having its ‘national sovereignty’ compromised, or acts, by contrast, on behalf of ‘capital’ in, for example, land grabbing and ‘agro-security
mercantilism’. Indeed, the defining feature of the ‘corporate’ food regime for McMichael is that states now serve capital, whereas as in the preceding regime capital served states. This is a very Manichaean view of the relation between state and capital, in which there is essentially an external rather than internal relation, a position that owes more to Polanyi than to Marx. There seems little appreciation here of the fundamental role of the state in affording the infrastructural prerequisites - material, legal, educational, ideological, etc. - without which capital would be incapable of accumulation and without which it would unravel in the face of its contradictions.

In the same vein, McMichael again displays a lack of understanding of what it is that defines capitalism, which for him seems to be identified merely by the realization of exchange value in the market (in reality, it is the realization of surplus value of embodied labour in the commodity form by means of exchange value). Thus, he invokes a ‘bowdlerized’ version of Marxian value theory that seems to have no clear basis in the social property relations that define capitalism proper - the alienation of labour and land, market dependency, and absolute property rights - again, a legacy of the intellectual tradition of WST. The result is that his understanding of what comprises capitalism is unspecific in terms of these class and state determinations. Consequently, his understanding of what comprises counter-hegemony (as FS) is not the subversion of capitalist social property relations but rather, again, a localism, with this latest iteration emphasizing above all its ecological credentials. Vital as the ecological dimension is, here McMichael (2016, 666) seems to be elevating this concern above that of social equity, further reinforcing the populist tone of his discourse.

In short, while we are very sympathetic towards McMichael’s advocacy of ecological localism, his assertion that FS will be secured by a generalized ‘small farmers’ movement seems naïve, at best, and politically regressive, at worst, conflating the important differences in envisioned social-property relations between the ‘reformism’ of small commercial farmers and the ‘radicalism’ of the middle and lower peasantry.

3. Proposing a Revised Causal Basis for, and Periodization of, Food Regimes

In defining a basis for FRT that has greater explanatory power than that offered by Friedmann and McMichael in their reliance on WST and partial rendering of
RT, we propose here the use of ‘Political Marxism’, in alliance with neo-Gramscian International Political Economy (Cox 1987; Bieler 2004; Morton 2007) and a full rendering of RT (as specified above). The first necessity is to develop an understanding of modern capitalism as opposed to ‘merchant’ or ‘commercial capitalism’, terms conflated by WST. Following Marx (1981) there is a need to specify modern capitalism in terms of class relations, composed of owners of the means of production counter-posed to an expropriated class ‘free’ to sell its labour power, in which, for the first time, power over production is exerted ‘economically’, not ‘politically’. As long as means of production are owned by capitalists and denied to labourers, the ‘dull compulsion of the economic’ obliges the latter to sell their labour power to the former. Modern capitalism is thus a qualitatively new phenomenon, a new mode of mobilizing social labour in the transformation of nature’ (Wolf 1982, 85). This contrasts markedly with the WST tradition where, following Weber and Braudel, capitalism is seen simply as an expansion of processes already at work within feudalism. If WST has no specific theory of capitalism, then, equally, it has no specific theory of the modern state. This is so because the newly constituted and institutionally separated spheres of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ are dialectically cognate and implied, with their very ‘separation in unity’ a consequence of the commodification of labour power and the establishment of absolute property rights in the means of production. At the same time, the modern state acquires a strategic ‘political’ role which the individual capitalist cannot fulfil. The state was instrumental in effecting the process of ‘primitive accumulation’ which created a proletariat ‘free’ to sell its labour power to the capitalist (Perelman 2000). Once capitalism was installed, the state deployed its power further to maintain and guarantee absolute property rights by the capitalist class, and to institute and support regimes of work discipline required by this new mode (Wolf 1982, 100). The modern state also assumed the essential role of arbitrating and managing contestation between fractions of capital (and between capitalists and its labour force) and of representing their interests in the inter-national arena.

This Marxian understanding of capitalism enables us to see that this new ‘mode of production’ emerged first, in mature form, only in England in the 18th century (Wolf 1982), although its origins may be traced back to the 15th century, again only in England (Brenner 1989; Wood 2002; Teschke 2003; Lacher 2006; Dimmock 2014). Contra WST, capitalism was not, therefore, a Europe-wide phenomenon prior to the 19th century, nor can the imperial dynamics of Portugal, Spain, and France be attributed to its logic - rather these dynamics were of
mercantile capitalism as an adjunct to the absolutist state variant of feudalism (or the ‘tributary mode of production’ according to Wolf (1982)).

Our qualitative view, presented first in modern times by Robert Brenner (1977, 1985) and pivoting around his concept of ‘social-property relations’, is now referred to as ‘Political Marxism’. Drawing inspiration from Marx’s mature works, notably Grundrisse and Capital, Brenner accords priority to the dynamics of class contestation in a strategic relational sense. Key to understanding modern capitalism for Marx and Brenner is ‘primitive accumulation’. Like Marx, Brenner rejects Adam Smith’s understanding of this concept, in which it is the accumulated wealth from mercantile capital that is seen as pivotal in the transition to modern capitalism, a view replicated in WST and described as ‘neo-Smithian Marxism’ by Brenner (1977). By contrast, Marx and Brenner see primitive accumulation as predicated on the separation of the peasantry from their means of production.

Brenner, rather than employing the term ‘social relations of production’, prefers that of ‘social-property relations’, principally because the former ‘is sometimes taken to convey the idea that the social structural framework in which production takes place is somehow determined by production itself, that is, the form of cooperation or organization of the labour process’ (Brenner 2007, 58). Brenner sees ‘disastrous consequences’ for specifying social system dynamics arising from the usual restrictive use of the ‘social relations of production’ concept. First, the importance of property relations between surplus appropriators and surplus producers is missed; and second, power relations between surplus appropriators and surplus producers that are actually pivotal to specifying class dynamics are relegated to the ‘political superstructure’. Thus, while surplus in pre-capitalist societies cannot be appropriated other than by political means, even in capitalism the ‘political superstructure’ of the state is actually infrastructural with respect to the accumulation and legitimation needs of capital.

Brenner, therefore, does not restrict attention to inter-class relations between capitalists and proletariat, for example. Intra-class contestation between capital fractions and between nation-states is considered of equal significance in capitalist dynamics. The ‘social-property relations’ formulation thus enables the traditionally ‘reified’ regions of the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ to be strongly re-
integrated. It also enables the state to be re-configured as a causally and theoretically meaningful entity in social system dynamics.

This conceptualization suggests the primacy of ‘political’ dynamics, or ‘class struggle’ around the key issues of ‘who owns what, who does what, who gets what, and what do they do with it?’ (Bernstein 2010, 22), mediated by discourse and the cultural politics of positionality, framed within the social formation, or ‘state’, comprising a distinct constellation of social-property relations and given coherence by a singular jurisdictional authority - within capitalism typically the nation-state. In contrast to the ‘externalist’ or ‘functionalist’ approach of WST, Political Marxism considers social formations to be co-conditioning - in other words, ‘external’ relations are mediated, refracted, and distilled out by the social-property relations of each social formation to constitute an ‘internal’ dynamic which co-develops, with varying degrees of asymmetry, with other social formations.

This conceptualization helps us to understand the co-evolution of capitalism and the modern state in 17th and 18th century England. The competitive edge afforded to the British state-capital nexus by first agrarian and then industrial capitalism led to the adoption, in modified form, of these social-property relations by other ‘core’ states in Europe and North America during the course of the 19th century. The constitution of capitalist food regimes was a key element of this process. Sooner or later, however, the constraints on the level of surplus value which could be generated within the confines of the nation-state began to be encountered, and capital, still grounded in the enabling and protective structure of the state, embarked on programmes of ‘combined and uneven development’, or imperialism (Trotsky 2008). This meant, and means, that capitalist growth in ‘core’ states occurs through ‘combined and uneven development’ with a consequent ‘periphery’, the latter’s development distorted to the benefit of the ‘core’ and peripheral comprador classes. Again, contra WST, this should not be understood in ‘functionalist’ terms according to the abstract logic of the ‘world system’, but rather as predicated on class and class fractional agency within the context of the state-capital nexus, and on power relations between the latter. Thus, ‘the pressures of uneven development are clearly mediated through different forms of state as nodal points of nationally specific configurations of class fractions and struggles over hegemony and/or passive revolution within accumulation conditions on a world scale’ (Morton 2010, 229).
This discussion enables us, following van Apeldoorn et al. (2012, 474), to distil out the key internal relations between capital and state which the state-capital nexus deploys to secure economic growth and political stability, and which frame the form and function of food regimes. These are:

1. Market creation: to engender, if necessary, re-establish, and ensure the effective functioning of markets, including the preconditions for capital accumulation like ‘primitive accumulation’;
2. Market correction: to mitigate the destructive social impacts of capital accumulation and, more generally, to manage the capital-labour relation, and to reproduce the subordination of the labour force to capital (legitimation function);
3. Market direction: to direct and supervise capital accumulation when private capital fails, or is unable, to do so, commonly referred to as ‘state intervention in the economy’ (accumulation function);
4. External representation: to represent the external interests of ‘domestic’ capital, extending from economic diplomacy to the forceful, or military, protection of business interests (accumulation and legitimation function, the latter elevating the ‘national interest’ above class and class fractional interest in the service of nationalism).

These key relations form, then, the basis for the constitution of food regimes, as subsidiary aspects of the functioning of the political economy of the state-capital nexus within the world capitalist system. With the first a basic premise of capitalist social-property relations, the relative importance of these relations will vary across space and time according to:

1. The class complexion of the state-capital nexus;
2. The ‘spatial’ location of the state-capital nexus (social formation) within the world system, whether ‘core’, ‘semi-periphery’, or ‘periphery’;
3. The ‘temporal’ location of the state-capital nexus within the overall trajectory of capitalism in terms of its developmental path dependency, e.g., the shift from competitive to monopoly capitalism.

Capitalism, in intimate conjunction with the state, thus generates food regimes as integral parts of its growth and power dynamic. This has a threefold logic which is tied up with both the accumulation and legitimation aspects of the state-capital nexus: first, to supply food, on a reasonably secure basis, to its expropriated labour force, now largely divorced from its means of production,
thereby hopefully securing its quiescence (relations 1 and 2 above); second, to supply this as cheaply and abundantly as possible, vital in exerting downward pressure on the socially average wage and thus in maximising surplus value in the production of competitive commodities, and in ensuring a transfer of surplus from agriculture to nascent industries (relations 3 and 4); and, third, to afford opportunities for profit-making by the various class fractions of agrarian capital (relations 3 and 4). As indicated, the state-capital nexus deploys all the four relations specified above to secure this logic.

With these basic, framing dynamics in mind we can propose the following, revised, typology of capitalist food regimes:

**The First National/Capitalist Food Regime, 1750-1846;**

**The First International, or Liberal, Food Regime 1846-1870;**

**The Second International, or Imperial, Food Regime 1870-1930;**

**The Third International, or Political Productivist, Food Regime 1930-1980;**

**The Fourth International, or Neoliberal, Food Regime 1980-2010;**

**The Fifth International, or Post-Neoliberal, Food Regime.**

The justification for, and substantive character of, the first four of these food regimes is presented in Tilzey (2018). It is the proposed fifth regime that is of most concern to us in this paper:

**The Fifth International, or Post-Neoliberal, Food Regime.** As the new millennium progressed, neoliberalism began to encounter increasing contradiction: in terms of capital accumulation, whereby greatly increased wealth disparities generated a crisis of commodity under-consumption (over-accumulation) (the financial crisis of 2007 was symptomatic of this trend); in terms, relatedly, of greatly increased precarity for the global majority, located particularly in the global South, and induced by heightened processes of primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession, leading to inability of the precariat to access even basic necessities (the 2008 global food crisis was symptomatic of this trend); and in terms of a progressive deterioration in the biophysical fabric of the planet and its ability to continue to supply resources to, and absorb waste from, an ever more profligate capitalism. In order to manage and mitigate (but not
resolve) these contradictions, states re-emerged ‘from the shadows’ to take again more interventionist roles in securing accumulation and legitimation functions for capital. These roles are manifested in a number of different ways: through greater market intervention, or neo-mercantilism, to secure food and energy supplies both domestically and overseas (the latter in part through ‘land-grabbing’); through the adoption of neo-developmental and redistributive policies to alleviate poverty, as in the ‘pink tide’ states of Latin America; and through efforts, particularly although not exclusively, by right-wing governments to legitimate and obscure the impacts of capital accumulation through authoritarian populism (Trumpism being an exemplar) and neo-imperialism. These developments suggest the fragmentation of neoliberal hegemony, if not as yet its supersession, and a return to heightened inter-state competition and antagonism reminiscent of the ‘Imperial’ Food Regime.

4. The emergence of China as a sub-imperium and the dynamics of the ‘pink tide’ states in Latin America

We are currently in the throes, therefore, of an immanent, epochal, crisis of neoliberalism, if not yet of capitalism in general. Imperial monopoly-finance capital has escalated its accumulation of land and natural resources in the peripheries, yet it faces three political challenges here (‘political’, or ‘first’ contradiction) (to say nothing of longer term biophysical constraints (‘ecological’, or ‘second’ contradiction) to which these are, in varying degrees, conjoined, Tilzey 2018). The first two represent sub-hegemonic challenges to the hegemony of neoliberalism: firstly, the national sovereignty regime established in the 20th century, although attenuated, is nonetheless still exercised even by the small states, often in the form of neo-developmentalist, supported by means of neo-extractivism; secondly, the emerging semi-peripheries (the sub-imperium), the unintended consequence of globalization, which, although not radical in themselves, have created new spaces and opportunities for manoeuvre by peripheral states. This sub-hegemonic trend is itself not without its own internal contradictions, these being intrinsic to capitalism and its necessarily state-based form (Tilzey 2016a). Monopolistic firms are springing up in the sub-imperium, notably the BRICS states (China, India, Brazil, South Africa) and scrambling themselves for natural resources, land, and food supplies. These often maintain a higher commitment to the sovereignty regime and to national development, as is the case with China particularly, than the global Northern imperium. Moreover, the economic flows ushered in across the South by this development have permitted some to circumvent the Northern debt trap, as with the ‘pink tide’
states of Latin America (Webber 2017b). But all are, nonetheless, subject to the socially and ecologically contradictory dynamics of capitalism. The third challenge arises from counter-hegemonic groups (middle and lower peasant economies, semi-proletarians, indigenous groups particularly) propounding a post-capitalist way of ‘good living’ akin to eco-socialism (Lowy 2013).

The first form of ‘sub-hegemonic’ resistance to neoliberalism derives in important respects from ‘internal’ state-level dynamics that can be understood only from the class analytical and state-capital nexus perspective invoked in this paper. This has been facilitated ‘externally’ by the rise of the sub-imperium, notably China. Neither of these phenomena can be understood from a perspective of a monolithic or fully trans-nationalised capitalism such as advocated by Robinson (2017) or McMichael (2013) (see Tilzey 2016a). China, in particular, has deployed neoliberal globalization as a strategic means of strengthening the industrial and military infrastructure of the state as a counterweight to the northern imperium, particularly the USA. While its growth trajectory is highly contradictory across both the ‘political’ and ‘ecological’ dynamics of capitalism (Tilzey 2018), and is heavily dependent on global Northern consumption, China’s emergence as a key site of capital accumulation has, nevertheless, opened up a space for other states in the global South to re-assert more nationally-based capitalist development or, at least, for national fractions of capital to selectively displace global Northern dominance. This has coincided with widespread disenchantment with neoliberalism in the global South, and in Latin America particularly. The boom in primary commodity prices stimulated by China’s growth has enabled sub-hegemonic fractions of national capital to ally with non-capitalist class (counter-hegemonic) forces to install a wave of populist, centre-left (‘pink tide’) regimes in Latin America (Spronk and Webber 2015). Here, therefore, there is an asymmetrical symbiosis between the sub-imperium, supporting national development through neo-mercantilism, and the ‘pink tide’ states of the periphery, seeking to pursue redistributive national-popular programmes on the proceeds of neo-extractivism.

This we can understand through our revised causal basis for defining food regimes, these comprising a sub-set of politico-economic relations within and between different state-capital nexus. These are the key relations between capital and state which the state-capital nexus deploys to secure economic
growth and political stability, and which frame the form and function of food regimes. In the case of China these are principally and in order of priority:

1. Market direction: to direct and supervise capital accumulation when private capital fails, or is unable, to do so, commonly referred to as ‘state intervention in the economy’ (accumulation function). This is deployed in the service of ‘national development’;

2. External representation: to represent the external interests of ‘domestic’ capital, extending from economic diplomacy to the forceful, or military, protection of business interests (accumulation and legitimation function, the latter elevating the ‘national interest’ above class and class fractional interest in the service of nationalism). This takes the form of neo-mercantilism, when accumulation demands grow beyond the capacity of the national territory to supply primary commodities in quantity and cheapness sufficient to secure continued competitive accumulation and the quiescence of the workforce (see below)

3. Market correction: to mitigate the destructive social impacts of capital accumulation and, more generally, to manage the capital-labour relation, and to reproduce the subordination of the labour force to capital (legitimation function).

In the case of the ‘pink tide’ states, these are principally, and in order of priority:

1. Market correction: to mitigate the destructive social impacts of capital accumulation and, more generally, to manage the capital-labour relation, and to reproduce the subordination of the labour force to capital (legitimation function). This assumes the form of social support and welfarism, through which subaltern classes may purchase food at reasonable cost. Such food is increasingly imported, however, although Ecuador has paid some attention to expanding the production of traditional food staples by the small farm commercial sector (upper peasantry);

2. Market direction: to direct and supervise capital accumulation when private capital fails, or is unable, to do so, commonly referred to as ‘state intervention in the economy’ (accumulation function). This is deployed in the service of ‘national development’, largely in the form of the state syphoning off an increased share of extractivism’s proceeds via ground rent. However, little in the way of ‘national capitalism’ has eventuated, with most funds being directed to infrastructure construction as employment generation schemes. There has been little attempt to improve the national production of food staples (other than Ecuador above) and the primary focus remains upon agro-extractivism within the sector.
China itself faces the ineluctable contradictions of capitalism, however. With the rural semi-proletariat no longer subsidizing the cost of industrial labour due the process of progressive full proletarianization (see Tilzey 2018), wage demands have been increasing, and China faces the prospect of losing its ‘comparative advantage’ in low labour power costs. This would potentially entail the migration of industry overseas to still cheaper areas of production such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, the suppression of wage demands, or the increased replacement of labour through mechanization. China thus confronts the ‘political’, or first, contradiction, of attempting to sustain high rates of growth in the face of rising labour costs, due to increasing full proletarianization of its labour force, and in the face of stagnating global demand, due to over-production/under-consumption crisis (see Tilzey 2018). Meanwhile, it attempts to maintain downward pressure on costs of production through the increasing import of energy, minerals, and indeed food, as ‘cheaps’ (Moore 2015), from overseas, undertaken by means of extractivism and ‘land grabbing’ as a form of neo-mercantilism. Through increasing political resistance in the zones of extractivism, through the inevitable secular depletion of resources, and through the unavoidable need to address unsustainable levels of pollution at home, rising costs will constitute an ‘ecological’, or second, contradiction for Chinese capital accumulation.

In respect of the latter, and specifically with regard to access to oil, it needs to be appreciated that this hydrocarbon is now a fundamental and vital input in Chinese manufacturing and construction. Whilst twenty-five years ago, China was the major oil exporter to all of East Asia (Ricaurte 2012), today it is a major oil importer, lying in second place globally behind the USA. The growing scarcity of this ‘cheap’ has already occasioned closures and paralysis of giant industrial complexes, in addition to the rise in the price of Chinese products that are consumed the world over (Bonilla 2015). Looming scarcity has stimulated China to seek access and control of petroleum resources on a global scale, bringing it, of course, into increasing competition with the other major centres of manufacturing and consumption, principally the states of the imperium (and this despite the fact that these same states are highly dependent on the Chinese for the production of imported, primarily lower-end, manufactures). In order to gain such strategic access to, and control over, petroleum supplies, China has created three huge multinationals: The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) (Katz 2015). The latter two companies are now heavily involved in oil exploration and production in Ecuador.
and Peru, for example, underwriting the neo-extractivism that characterizes the economies of those states. Exploration and production are concentrated in the Amazonian lowlands, commonly on the lands of indigenous, tribal peoples, and in areas of extremely high biodiversity, supposedly afforded protection from exploitation for both these cultural and ecological reasons (Arsel 2016). Such notional protections have been overridden, of course, in the quest for oil, that vital and irreplaceable energetic ingredient of capital accumulation. Despite increasing levels of conflict with indigenous groups and high levels of ecological despoliation, the quest is awarded relative immunity by those neo-extractivist states, their interests aligning symbiotically with those of Chinese capital accumulation. These neo-extractive developments in hydrocarbons are mirrored in China’s involvement in minerals and agro-extractivism, with soya production prominent in the latter, Bolivia playing an important role here (McKay 2017).

The dynamics of populist, ‘pink tide’ states such as Bolivia and Ecuador are highly contradictory, therefore, both ‘politically’ and ‘ecologically’. They have been able to support social welfare programmes and infrastructure development only through resource extraction fed, to a significant degree, by the Chinese commodity boom. But they have been reluctant to put in place sustainable food production and livelihood systems based on land redistribution and security of land rights, precisely because the growth model is premised on the perpetuation of extractivism and agro-export productivism. So, while the regimes of Correa/Moreno (Ecuador) and Morales (Bolivia) have relied heavily upon peasant and indigenous support to secure electoral success, and have included provisions for food sovereignty in their new constitutions, moves towards substantive implementation of these provisions, through key measures such as land redistribution, have fallen far short of expectation (Henderson 2017, Webber 2017a, b). Consequently, these agrarian and indigenous constituencies of support are becoming increasingly alienated from centre-left regimes such as those in Bolivia and Ecuador. Moreover, the current decline in primary commodity prices is likely to see a reduction in government budgets for social programmes and a renewed focus on austerity, with a resultant melting away of subaltern support for these regimes. As the ‘left’ populist compact between ‘sub-hegemonic’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ forces begins to fray, so have the governments of Bolivia and Ecuador become increasingly authoritarian, using both ‘legal’ and extra-legal measures to quell mounting resistance from those expropriated from land, those having inadequate or insecure access to land, or
those landless seeking employment under conditions of ‘jobless’ growth (see McKay 2017).

5. Conclusion: Beyond the Impasse of Neo-developmentalistm and Neo-extractivism - Dual Strategy and Food Sovereignty as Counterhegemony

Populism, as a national-popular programme of development (neo-developmentalistm), pursues a form of redistributive capitalism, focusing on the accumulation needs of its core sub-hegemonic constituency, while using the proceeds of neo-extractivism (generated largely by the oligarchy and transnational capital) to placate counter-hegemonic classes through welfarism. This enables the structural bases of inequality and poverty to be temporarily bypassed or mitigated, but only at the cost of deepening the political and ecological contradictions of extractive capitalism. As these contradictions deepen, exacerbated by ‘jobless’ growth and high dependency on external markets, so does social unrest grow commensurately. The response of the ruling bloc is a turn to increasing authoritarianism to push through its programme of accelerated commodification and destruction of the biophysical foundations for sustainable living (*buen vivir*) in the name of short-lived growth and consumerism. It is therefore moot as to how long the populist compact between sub- and counter-hegemonic interests can endure. The fiscal capacity of the reformist state is dependent upon the inherently unsustainable, and time-limited, revenue windfall that derives from neo-extractivism. Whether through progressive exhaustion of the resource base (‘second’, ecological, contradiction) or through a collapse in the commodity boom as a result of accumulation crisis in China (‘first’, political, contradiction), or a combination of both, the model of neo-developmentalistm pursued by states like Bolivia and Ecuador is built on shifting sands. If and when revenues from extractivism begin to dry up, the short-term consumer boom, the welfare payments, and the class alliances that go with them, are likely to unravel. At this point, the populist/reformist regime will encounter the limits of its legitimacy, and, indeed, we have already entered a period of increased violence and authoritarianism in response to enhanced protests against extractivism in the Bolivian and Ecuadorian *Oriente*, particularly.

The ‘radical’ counter-hegemonic model of food sovereignty, deriving from our political Marxian understanding of food regimes, does, however, enable us to suggest some answers to the question of political strategy in relation to escaping the impasse of authoritarian populism and neo-extractivism. Here Poulantzas (1978) is very useful, translating his class-relational understanding of the state-
capital nexus into a programme of political praxis. Poulantzas vitiates the Leninist ‘dual powers’ approach which seeks to construct workers’ councils wholly outside the state, considered (incorrectly) to be entirely a bourgeois instrument. The workers’ councils, having achieved critical mass, then ‘smash’ the state and replace it with a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. This then becomes Stalinist statism. Poulantzas sees social democracy as also embodying this statism, comprising a profound mistrust of mass initiatives and suspicion of democratic demands. The latter manifests itself in the Latin American ‘pink tide’ states as examples of reformist passive revolution.

Poulantzas also notes another position akin to post-developmentalist and agrarian populism. According to this conception, the only way to avoid statism is to place oneself outside the state, leaving it as it is and disregarding the problem of its transformation. This aims simply to block the path of the state from outside through the construction of self-management ‘counter-powers’ at the base - in short, to quarantine the state within its own domain. Poulantzas notes that this appears in the language of the ‘new libertarians’ (antecedents of post-structuralism and post-developmentalist), for whom statism can be avoided only by breaking up power and scattering it among an infinity of micro-powers. This has much in common with the praxis expounded by agrarian populists like Friedmann and McMichael. In this case, however, ‘the Leviathan-State is left in place, and no attention is given to those transformations of the State without which the movement of direct democracy is bound to fail. The movement is prevented from intervening in actual transformations of the State and the two processes are simply kept running along parallel lines’ (Poulantzas 1978, 262). He goes on to suggest that the task, then, is not really to ‘synthesize’ or stick together the statist and self-management traditions, ‘but rather to open up a global perspective of the withering away of the State. This comprises two articulated processes: transformation of the State and the unfurling of direct, rank-and-file democracy.’ (Poulantzas 1978, 263). This points strongly towards a dual strategy for ‘radical’ food sovereignty, one that seeks to exploit opportunities for democratic socialism (as eco-socialism) at the local level, whilst simultaneously engaging the state in order to transform capitalist social-property relations at national level.

If this social relational and institutional transformation of the state-capital nexus is the essential prerequisite for livelihood sovereignty, which social forces might bring this about? We suggest that it is the middle and lower peasanthies, and indigenous peoples, possibly in alliance with the proletarian precariat, which comprise the main counter-hegemonic agent for emancipatory politics as
livelihood sovereignty. This is so because they view access to non-commodified land, the escape from market dependence, and the equitable and ecologically sustainable production of use values to meet fundamental need satisfaction, as the key objectives of social relational transformation (Vergara-Camus 2014). So, although the middle and lower peasantry have indeed become progressively more (semi)-proletarianized under neoliberalism, and subsequently neo-extractivism (Carrión and Herrera 2012; Webber 2015), they have, contra Bernstein (2014), resisted the adoption of a proletarian class positionality. This is so because, for them, poverty equates to a gradual loss of peasant status, which they consequently seek to reverse. The desire for such a reversal has indeed become ever more insistent as the contradictions of neoliberalism, and now neo-extractivism, have mounted and the proletariat has increasingly acquired the status of a precariat. Access to land, however limited, often provides, under these conditions, the only real element of livelihood security. Thus, struggles in the countryside and in the city often have an essentially peasant character due to the incapacity of disarticulated development or neo-extractivism to provide salaried employment as a viable alternative to secure the means of livelihood. Both peasants and workers seek refuge in the peasant situation, therefore, that is, in the auto-production of use values, to the greatest degree possible, to meet fundamental needs (Vergara-Camus 2014).

Thus, the resolution of the unresolved agrarian question of the peasantry in Latin America, particularly in the current ecologically constrained and increasingly volatile conjuncture, seems, contra Bernstein, more than ever to be, of necessity, agrarian and peasant in nature. In this, the potential for mass mobilization on the part of the middle/lower peasantry, the precariat, and indigenous groups, for an agrarian solution to the contradictions, ‘political’ and ‘ecological’, of capitalism (expressed in ongoing primitive accumulation) should not be regarded as unrealistic. It is evident, however, that the (authoritarian) populist regimes in the ‘pink tide’ states, through their links with the sub-imperium, have the capacity to delay or subvert such mobilizations by co-opting elements of the precariat through welfarism, by fomenting a petty bourgeois consciousness amongst the upper peasantry, and by conserving the power of the oligarchy. It will be important, consequently, for counter-hegemonic forces, in their wish to secure autonomy from market dependence through secure access to the means of production, to confront both ‘capitalism from below’ and ‘capitalism from above’ – in short, a dual strategy for livelihood sovereignty, embodying a post-capitalist food regime as ‘radical’ food sovereignty.
Footnotes

1 McMichael (2013, 11) makes reference to the ‘mode of regulation’ as expressing a policy environment conducive to an ‘accumulation regime’ and its normalization, but the full implications of this concept in terms of class, state, capital relations and dynamics are never really explored.

1 Thus, while they do suggest that ‘it is possible to see a mutual conditioning of the state system and capital’ (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 112) this is clearly conceptualized as an external relation, as is indicated by the following: ‘In both movements agriculture became incorporated within accumulation itself, and states and national economies became increasingly subordinated to capital. We conclude that the growing power of capital to organize and re-organize agriculture undercuts state policies directing agriculture to national ends, such as food security, articulated development, and the preservation of rural/peasant communities’ (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 95).

1 Friedmann (2005) later takes her development of food regime theory a certain way in this direction through her notion of ‘implicit rules’ governing each regime, but this, in our view, is never systematically delineated.

1 There may, of course, not be a confluence of interest between dominant class fractions in different states, in which case the would-be hegemon will be resisted, and divergent food regimes may then run concurrently, as in the case of the ‘Imperial Food Regime’ as defined by Tilzey (2018).

1 The term is deliberately reversed here because it is the combination of a core with a super-exploited periphery that generates uneven development.
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